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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes the changes and continuity within Turkish foreign policy since 2002, 
under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AKP). In order to 
understand modern Turkish politics, it is important to realize Turkey’s aspirations of becoming a 
full member of the European Union and its subsequent push for strategic alliances with the 
Middle East and former Turkic republics from the Soviet Union. The evidence shows that 
Turkey has consistently strived to improve its relationship with the EU in its effort to become a 
full member state, but the EU’s reluctance to accept Turkey as an equal member state has led to 
enduring obstacles and an unfinished journey since 1987. Turkey’s strategic geographical 
location (Afro-Eurasia) makes it possible to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy in the 
region. Furthermore, the thesis also examines the influence of national identity (Turkism / 
Turkishness) and religious identity (Islam for the Ottomanism) that play an important role in 
determining Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, Balkans and Turkic states in Caucasus 
and Central Asia. Turkish foreign policy has shifted from a Hobbesian realism to a slightly more 
Kantian approach that espouses diplomacy, negotiation, and other civilian instruments such as 
economic and multilateral cooperation. This new approach was also adopted toward the Arab 
world, with which relations have significantly improved under AKP government. Relations with 
the West have been viewed as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, relations with the 
Islamic world.
1
 In this context, during the Ottoman Empire, Islam was seen as the pillar of 
Ottoman society. This society was based on the millet system, - a system which was defined 
according to the society’s' religion rather than ethnic or national communities by the Ottoman 
Empire.
2
 Islam and Ottomanism were meant to build continuity between Turkey’s foreign policy 
toward Europe and in the Middle East, Balkans, Turkic states in Caucasus and Central Asia. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 Aydin, Senem, and Rusen Cakir. Political Islam and European Foreign Policy: Perspectives From Muslim 
Democrats of the Mediterranean. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2007. Print.  
2
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CHAPTER I 
 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
This thesis traces the changes and continuities in Turkey’s foreign policy under the ruling 
AKP government since 2002.  I argue in this thesis that Turkey is increasing a multidimensional 
approach for improving its relations with Western and Eastern countries. I further argue that 
Turkey, under the leadership of the AKP, is pursuing policies that build alliances with the 
Middle East and former Islamic republics in the region, while maintaining its aspirations for full 
acceptance into the European Union (EU). There is also an emerging religious surge and 
nationalism that draw from Turkey’s historical, geographical and cultural ties to nearby states in 
the Middle East.  For that reason, the AKP government took a series of new initiatives to expand 
and improve Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East. In addition, I argue that Turkey 
does not seek to deny its relationship with the West, but rather hopes to expand its sphere of 
influence by building new alliances with former Islamic states in the region, such as the Balkans 
and former Soviet Republics.  Instead of severing ties with the EU, the Turkish government 
strives to build a strong and secure modern nation-state.  
The current Turkish government is also rediscovering its own Ottoman historical roots 
and religious national identity.  Turkey’s lost prestige, as a result of the European Union’s denial 
of membership since April 1987, paved the way for a historic choice to adopt a multidimensional 
foreign policy approach that draws on Turkey’s historical, geographical and cultural ties to 
nearby states in the Middle East. Turkey finds itself in a unique position to balance its aspirations 
of being fully accepted as a European Union member, while upholding its historical ties with the 
Middle East. This thesis demonstrates how Turkey’s foreign policy has evolved since the AKP 
came to power and analyzes why it became critical for Turkey to pursue a multidimensional 
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approach.  I argue that the European Union’s ambiguity about Turkey’s full membership, since 
1987, led the AKP government to initiate a series of steps to expand and improve its relationship 
with the Middle East.  
In this effort to improve its relationship with Middle Eastern countries and the former 
Islamic republics, Turkey highlighted its own Ottoman historical roots to gain political position 
and prestige as Turks. In describing the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy, the scholarly 
debate refers to these changes as a “more independent, active and multidimensional” approach in 
the Middle East. During the AKP government’s first term in power in 2002, the push for the EU 
membership was central to Turkish foreign policy. However, since the denial of full accession by 
the EU in 2007, an important aspect of Turkish foreign policy has been an increased dialogue 
with the Middle East by the AKP government during its second term in office. It is also 
important to note that the current AKP government’s foreign policy is influenced by 
conservative constituencies. The recent emphasis on Islamism indicates a rebirth of nationalism 
in AKP’s modern politics. In this context, this research examines how the AKP conducted 
Turkish foreign policy since 2002. In seeking answers to the following questions, this paper will 
employ the concepts of transformation, change and continuity, under the AKP’s foreign policy 
experience since 2002. 
1. Why did Turkey pursue a multidimensional foreign policy approach?  
2. What is the evidence to show that the AKP tried to improve its relations with the EU in 
an effort to gain full membership? 
3. What evidence is there that Turkey has increased religious and nationalist identity?  
4. What evidence is there that Turkey sees itself as a legacy of the Ottoman Empire in 
relation to the Middle East, Balkans, and Turkic Republics in Caucasus and Central Asia?  
6 
 
Methodology 
For the purpose of this thesis, I will rely on qualitative methods. Firstly, I use secondary 
source materials and literatures about Turkey’s foreign policy. Secondly, I include interviews 
and newspaper articles to shed light on Turkish foreign policy since 2002.  Moreover, I use 
related books, articles, journals, reports and interviews with academic and professional experts.  
Turkish foreign policy leaders, under AKP, have been implementing a policy of “zero 
problems with neighbors” and a “soft power role” in the Middle East from the beginning of 2004 
as a strategy. Moreover, the AKP has implemented a “multi-dimensional” approach since they 
assumed power in the government, which has contributed to a transformation of Turkish foreign 
policy and the rising importance of Turkey’s diplomatic role, especially in the Middle East. 
Throughout the AKP era, there has been a constant emphasis on the use of soft power, and an 
improvement of relations with all neighboring countries.
3
 According to an interview in Foreign 
Affairs’ magazine with Former President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, a former foreign minister and 
prime minister and Turkey's head of state and commander in chief, he embraced defending both 
Turkey's Muslim identity and its pluralistic values. Gul has quietly pursued a more moderate and 
progressive path for championing the rule of law, and helping reorient his country's foreign 
policy eastward while remaining a forceful advocate of integration with Europe.
4
 
  
                                                          
3
 Onis, Ziya. "Multiple Faces of the “New” Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique." Insight 
Turkey 13.1 (2011): 55. Web.  
4
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CHAPTER II 
Review of the Literature  
In recent years, numerous books and articles have been published about Turkey’s modern 
foreign policy. This literature describes how Turkey’s foreign policy has been shaped by its 
relations with the European Union and Middle East, while providing a reevaluation of Turkey’s 
Ottoman past. This section reviews some of the literature on Turkish foreign policy since 2002, 
analyzing the changes and continuities under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi, AKP).  The literature also shows that the pursuit of a multidimensional 
approach and rediscovery of Turkey’s identity as a Muslim country produces a new 
understanding of Turkish foreign policy. 
Ozlem Terzi analyzes the influence of the European Union (EU) and changes in Turkish 
foreign policy in the decades of the pre-accession process. Based on the concept of 
‘Europeanization’ from the aspects of social, perception, values, identity and behavior of actors 
involved in the making of foreign policy, the author discusses the influence of the EU on 
changes in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) . Moreover, she explains the challenges and issues that 
changed in TFP and the transformation of the policy makers’ mind set (a shift in the balance of 
power between actors involved in the process of policy making). She also examines the 
experience that TFP went through since 1999. “The AKP government has been comparatively 
much more proactive than previous governments in pursuing ambitious foreign policy goals.”5 
Galip Dalay and Dov Friedman describes the history that is rooted in a tradition of both 
continuity and change vis-à-vis the AKP’s political Islamist predecessors, the Welfare (Refah) 
                                                          
5
 Terzi, Ozlem. The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy. Farnham Surrey: Ashgate, 2010. 
135. Print.  
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Party and Virtue (Fazilet) Party. By understanding the values, motivations, failures and lessons 
of the AKP’s political ancestors, it may give us a better understanding of the last decade of the 
AKP’s foreign policy and its continuing evolution. In this regard, “the ways the AKP 
understands the Welfare Party’s failures and seeks to transcend it help frame the evolution of 
AKP’s foreign policy and illuminate the reassessment necessitated by the Syrian uprising.”6 The 
AKP shaped its vision around the lessons learned from its ancestor parties, “the EU policy 
marked a major shift for the AKP from its Welfare party. Just as important, it centered the 
AKP’s early foreign policy agenda on domestic considerations which strengthened the party’s 
position at home.”7 Turkey’s political Islamist tradition has envisioned a great role for the 
country internationally. According to Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign policy vision, Turkey should 
stand as a “central power” in the world. In short, nearly two decades after the Welfare Party 
articulated a different vision of how Turkey could become a leading power, the AKP in pursuing 
a foreign policy its predecessors failed to recognize or support. 
E. Fuat Keyman and Sebnem Sunucu examine Turkey’s transformation under the rule of 
a dominant party, AKP, they examine the modern history of Turkey, the concept of 
transformation and AKP’s hegemony in Turkish politics. “That transformation under the AKP 
generates a new center and empowers new actors through economic, social and political 
transformation, while undermining the power of secular elite, that is, the military and judiciary, 
through civilianization of politics.”8 They argue that Turkey’s foreign policy activism 
transformed its standing in the international community while improving economic relations 
                                                          
6
 Dalay, Galip, and Dov Friedman. "The AK Party and the Evolution of Turkish Political Islam’s Foreign Policy." 
Seta Foundation 15.2 (2013): 123-39. Web.  
7
 Dalay and Friedman, 123-39. Web 
8
 Keyman, E. Fuat, and Sebnem Gumuscu. Democracy, Identity, and Foreign Policy in Turkey. Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014. Print.  
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particularly in the region, ultimately feeding into AKP’s hegemony at home. The AKP’s identity 
as a center-right party, promised economic growth (neoliberal economics- greater integration 
with the global economy via expanding exports and inflow of foreign direct investments), 
stability, democratization and improved public service to the people have been particular success 
under the AKP rule in the last decade. The hegemony of the AKP, which has been a function of 
multidimensional change in Turkey, allowed the party to carry out this transformation in the 
areas of economic modernization, Europeanization and an expanded foreign policy.  
M. Hakan Yavuz examines the social and political roots of AKP, in his book “The 
Emergence of a new Turkey.” He is looking for the answer to the question of “what are the major 
constitutive principles of the ideology and identity of the AKP, and how is the party different 
from earlier Islamic parties in Turkey?”9 Yavuz affirms about the inevitable clash of the 
Kemalist and Islamist ideologies in terms of rise of the political Islam as the failure of Kemalism 
or the demise of Islamism with the rise of Kemalism. Moreover, Yavuz examines the origins and 
policies of AKP in terms of social and political context of the new Muslim actors, the Islamist 
bourgeoisie, the AKP’s identity, its politics and its relationship with Islamic political groups. 
Especially the Islamic bourgeoisie, because the bourgeoisie provides the financial means to 
develop the political movement through its charities, TV stations, radios and newspapers. “The 
AKP has a good understanding of Ottoman history. This history provides them a rich laboratory 
of insight and lessons that are useful for guiding current politics.”10 
The authors, Nesecan Balkan, Erol Balkan and Ahmet Oncu, study neoliberalism and the 
rise of Islamist capital relationships and the emergence of a new class, the Islamist bourgeoisie – 
the Islamist middle classes-  in their book, “The Neoliberal Landscape and the Rise of Islamist 
                                                          
9
 Yavuz, M.Hakan. The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti. Glen Canyon: University of 
Utah, 2006. Print.  
10
 Yavuz, 333 
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Capital in Turkey.” They examine Turkey’s relationship with Islam and Islamism. Moreover, the 
dynamics behind the rise of Islamists were reasons for the success and resilience of the AKP. 
They also argue that there is a political and ideological battle between the Kemalist and 
democratic Islamist government. The authors analyze how the Islamist movement in Turkey, as 
represented by the AKP, has become a model for some Islamist movements around the world. 
The authors argue that “the ideology of capitalist Islam is finding a new footing and capitalism 
continues in the form of a neoliberal Islam.”11  
Sebnem Cevik and Philip Seib write about Turkey’s growing geostrategic importance (a 
bridge between Europe and Asia). They analyze Turkey’s foreign policy based on ‘value based’ 
and ‘zero-problems with neighbors (komsularla sifir sorun)’ policies as a ‘soft power’ in the 
Middle East. Moreover, Turkey’s Ottoman past is a factor for reemerging cooperation between 
Turkey and the Balkans. Cevik and Seib also examine Turkey’s institutions that directly or 
indirectly work in establishing diplomacy and influence in the region. They write about 
“Turkey’s ‘soft power’ efforts largely focused on the country’s Ottoman heritage which 
resonates well with Africa, Balkan and Middle Eastern audiences.”12 Thus, they argue that 
Turkey’s foreign policy involvement with Muslim countries projects its strategic influence. 
Senem Aydin and Rusen Cakir argue that “an overwhelming majority of AKP members 
view the EU as the primary anchor of Turkish democracy and modernization. Yet, the growing 
mistrust towards the EU as a result of inferred discrimination and double-standard practices by 
the EU has a serious potential to reverse these perceptions within the party.”13 They also write 
about how the EU accession process played a crucial role in the renewed formation of Turkey’s 
                                                          
11
 Balkan, Nesecan, Erol Balkan, and Ahmet Oncu, eds. The Neoliberal Landscape and the Rise of the Islamist 
Capital in Turkey. Vol. 14. New York: Berghahn, 2015. Print.  
12
 Cevik, B. Sebnem, and Philip Seib, eds. TURKEY'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015. Print. 
13
 Aydin, Senem, and Rusen Cakir, 46  
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Islamic identity. “The incompatibility of Western values with Islam is also often invoked 
together with claims that instead of pressing for EU membership, Turkey should look more 
towards the East.”14 
Ayla Gol discusses the Turkish state transformation with reference to the complex 
interplay between Islam, modernity and Turkish foreign policy.  She critically analyzes Turkey’s 
historical engagement with European modernity as the transformation of an Islamic, Ottoman 
state and particularly its foreign policy towards the Middle East. Thus, she claims that Turkey 
shifted its foreign policy towards the Middle East under the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), 
by emphasizing it’s cultural and historical ‘soft’ power. She also argues the importance of 
“nationalism as a third pillar of the interdisciplinary approach to understand the foreign policy of 
a transitional state.”15 
Conclusion 
By analyzing the various recent studies regarding Turkish foreign policy, we can observe 
the complexities of Turkey’s relationships with the European Union and the Middle East in the 
past few decades.  My thesis adds to the literature by attempting to examine the transformation 
of Turkish foreign policy in terms of change and continuity since 2002, under the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). This paper’s primary objective is to demonstrate how the ongoing 
Turkey-EU accession negotiations, since 1987, led the AKP to make adjustments in its foreign 
policy.  For instance, Turkey’s involvement with the Islamic world is an active effort to negotiate 
affairs between the Middle East and the West.  This multidimensional approach to foreign policy 
is an opportunity to learn and improve relations between all countries involved in the age of 
                                                          
14
Aydin and  Cakir, 46  
15
 Gol, Ayla. Turkey Facing East: Islam, Modernity and Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
Print.  
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globalization. The change is from one dimensional policy to multidimensional and from realist 
approach to liberal international foreign policy practices. The new geopolitical vision, under the 
AKP period, has a strong sense of geopolitical continuity within the immediate region of Turkey. 
This continuity indicates that, given historical, social, cultural, and geo-economic intersections, 
the territory of Turkey is considered inseparable from its surrounding geographies. This 
geopolitical reasoning gives a unique place to Turkey in its foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Historical Background  
Turkish foreign policy, Kemalism or also known as Ataturkism, was implemented by 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey, after the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire (1908-1922). Turkey went through a major modernization under the 
Kemalist reforms. “This revolution imposed from above was designed to achieve Ataturk’s 
objective of attaining the level of ‘contemporary civilization’.”16 Ataturk embraced reforms such 
as: civil, political, social, cultural, and religious and secularism, including the establishment of 
democracy during his presidency (1923-1938). Turkish foreign policy had been firmly anchored 
upon the verities of Kemalism for about 60 years, with the expression of “Peace at home, Peace 
Abroad.” 
Turkey experienced a shift in foreign policy under the leadership of Turgut Ozal (1983-
1993), who became the first civilian president since the military coup in 1960. During his tenure, 
first as prime minister from 1983 through 1989 and then president from 1989 until 1993, the 
Turkish leader was characterized by his singular involvement in the restructuring of the Turkish 
economy and robust internal and activist foreign policy. His style of governance represented 
many common themes with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that some in Turkey called 
Ozalism.
17
  
Ozalism is the period of Turgut Ozal’s leadership (1983-1993) in Turkish Foreign Policy. 
Ozal implemented liberal policies and abandoned inward oriented economic and foreign policies. 
“In the 1980s, Turkey’s political agenda was dominated by high economic growth rate, and 
                                                          
16
 Oran, Baskin. Turkish Foreign Policy. Glen Canyon: The University of Utah Press, 2010. 904. Print.  
17
 Murinson, Alexander. "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy." Middle Eastern Studies 42.6 
(2006): 945-64.  
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revolutionary structural change towards an industrial country. Under Ozal’s liberal economic 
policies, the Turkish economy grew at an annual rate of over five percent.”18 ‘Again a great 
Turkey’ was one of the slogan from Ozalism’s economic success and regaining of national 
confidence. This also affected the conduct of Ozalist foreign policy. Ozal argued that Western 
civilization was not the only civilization on earth, and that Turkey did not have to choose 
between either European, Turkish or Islamic civilizations. For Ozal, the Turks were European 
Muslims; therefore Turkey did not need to change its mentality or civilizational mode to be 
European. He argued that Turkey had always been, still is, and would be a part of Europe. 
Moreover, “Ozal argued the Turkish version of Islam is different from the Iranian or the Arab 
Islam for integrating with Europe and western systems. He claimed that the Turkish Islamic 
outlook could provide peace between Muslims and the others, since religion and progress could 
go hand in hand.”19 In short, Ozal fused the political, economic and cultural systems of previous 
Turkism, Ottomanism, Conservatism and Liberalism into a new kind of Ottomanism or rather 
Ozalism.  
“People are not the servants of the state, but the state must be servant of the people.” 
                                                                                                                       Turgut Ozal, 1993 
The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, abbreviated as ANAP) was founded by Turgut 
Ozal in 1983. “The ANAP was considered a center-right neoliberal, conservative, nationalist and 
social democrat party.”20 ANAP took ownership of the neoliberal political agenda as opposed to 
the agendas of other political parties. Ozal described the state’s role as a regulator. Therefore, 
Turgut Ozal followed a different path with neoliberalism, something Turkish politics were not 
familiar with until 1983. Ozal was an admirer of the American political, cultural and economic 
                                                          
18
 http://www.turkishweekly.net/2009/03/09/article/turgut-özal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-özalism/ 
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20
 Karabulut Kerem. "ÖZAL DÖNEMI TURKIYE'NIN EKONOMI-POLITIGI." Scribd.com. 998.Web. 
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system. His dream was to make Turkey another America – his role model. It can be argued that 
Ozal’s ideology consisted of American secularism, American democracy, American capitalism 
and American liberalism. Therefore, Turkish-American relations were vital for Ozal’s domestic 
and external policies. “One of the main pillars of Ozalism, with its Turkism and Islamism, was 
liberalism and American-type democracy. For Ozal, all these principles were compatible, not 
contradictory.”21 
During Ozal’s administration, the term neo-Ottomanism was introduced by a leading 
Turkish columnist and academic Cengiz Candar and this movement advocated Turkish pursuit of 
an active and diversified foreign policy in the region based on Ottoman historical heritage. Neo-
Ottomanism envisioned Turkey as a leader of the Muslim and Turkic worlds and a central power 
in Eurasia.
22
 Ozal wanted to have an effective foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union both in world politics and especially in the Middle East. Ozal used to preach the slogan, 
saying the, “21st century must be led by Turkey and the Turkish people.”23 The goal was for 
Turkey to serve as a model for the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union– the 
predominantly Muslim countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus that were secular, democratic, 
free market oriented, and aligned with the West. “Turkey desired to export its ideology and 
regime to the Turkish - speaking republics to form alliances in a particularly unstable region of 
the world.”24 Turgut Ozal wanted to assume a new role for Turkey in foreign policy as a “bridge” 
between the East and the West by using Turkey’s geographic location. Turkey’s geography has 
played an important role in shaping its foreign policy. 
Turkey’s Geographic Importance 
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 http://www.turkishweekly.net/2009/03/09/article/turgut-özal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-özalism/ 
22
 Murinson, 946 
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24
 Celik, Yasemin. Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy. Westport: Praeger, 1999. 2. Print.  
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Turkey is surrounded on three sides by sea. It provides a natural passage between Europe 
and Asia as the country rests on both continents. The passageways between the two continents 
are controlled by the straights of Bosporus and the Dardanelles. 
Turkey’s geography that is most relevant to its foreign policy includes: its 
strategically important seas and straights; its status as a country that rests in both 
Asia and Europe; its geopolitical position as a state bordered by the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War and its location and history in the Middle East. These 
straights have played a prominent role in Turkey’s foreign affairs. Throughout 
history, the straights increased Turkey’s importance in the world arena because of 
its power to deny passage through these waterways, and its commitment that it 
would not hesitate to do so if this were required for the country’s safety in times 
of war. Turkey’s exclusive control of the straights of Bosporus and the 
Dardanelles even contributed to its entry as a central figure into Cold War 
politics.
25
 
 
The Rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Platform 
The success of the AKP in the early 2000s can be traced to inroads made in the 1990s by 
the Welfare Party (WP; Refah Partisi), an Islamic party founded in 1983 by Prof. Dr. Necmettin 
Erbakan (1926-2011). Necmettin Erbakan turned Turkish Islamism into an independent and 
stable political movement in the 1970s.
26
 Necmettin Erbakan, the long-time leader of Turkey’s 
Islamic political movement, was a Prime Minister (June 28
th
, 1996 - June 30
th
 1997) in the 
country’s first Islamic-led coalition. Despite political bans and party closures, he always re-
emerged and never wavered from his belief in Islamic Turkey.  
In 1970, Erbakan established the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP), which 
advocated a return to religious values and national vision movement (Milli Gorus Hareketi). The 
party was closed in 1971, then re-emerged in 1973 as the National Salvation Party, (Milli 
                                                          
25
 Celik, 98 
26
 Balkan, Nesecan, Erol Balkan, and Ahmet Oncu, 33. 
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Selamet Partisi - MSP). Twice in the 1970s, Erbakan briefly served as deputy Prime Minister 
(the second time was during the Cyprus crisis of 1974). The 1980 military coup banned the 
National Salvation Party and put Erbakan in prison. In 1983, Erbakan founded the Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi - RP) and he emerged as leader of conservative this party. In 1995, Erbakan led his 
party to unexpected electoral success with 21 per cent of the national vote. In 1996, after striking 
a coalition deal with another party leader, Erbakan became first Islamist Prime Minister of 
Turkey. “In 1997, the coalition government was forced to resign by military memorandum and 
the Constitution court shot down the Welfare party and put a political ban on Erbakan for 
violating the constitutional and principle of secularism.”27 Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi - FP) soon 
replaced the Welfare party in 1999. Recai Kutan and Abdullah Gul competed for the party 
leadership in the first congress of the Virtue Party in 2000.  
Recai Kutan won the leadership of the Virtue Party, but this leadership competition was 
seen as a battle between the “traditionalist” (represented by Erbakan’s close aids) and the 
“reformist” (represented by Abdullah Gul) within Turkish Islamism. Although, Abdullah Gul 
lost the leadership race, the reformist soon prevailed in the entire movement. Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan (a former mayor of Istanbul [1994–98]) emerged as a candidate for a new Islamist 
leadership. Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gul founded the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi - AKP) in 2001 and won a quick victory in the parliamentary elections of 2002, 
taking 34 per cent of popular vote. Mr. Erdogan served as prime minister of Turkey from 2003 to 
2014 at which he became president. He is the 12
th
 president of Turkey. 
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The increasing role of Islam in Turkish life in the 1980s and ’90s, paved the way for Mr. 
Gul and Mr. Erdogan to form the AKP as a democratic, conservative, non-confessional 
movement. Unlike its predecessors, the AKP did not center its image on an Islamic identity; 
indeed, its leaders underscored that it was not an Islamist party and emphasized that its focus was 
democratization, not the politicization of religion. Nevertheless, the political roots of the AKP 
and its leadership, some of the party’s political endeavors (including proposed regulation of the 
display and advertisement of alcohol), and the head scarves worn by some AKP leaders’ 
wife’s—including Emine Erdoğan (Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s wife) and Hayrünnisa Gül 
(Abdullah Gul’s Wife)—meant that the AKP was viewed as Islamist Party.  
The AKP conducted a new era in Turkish politics since they came to the power in 2002. 
“The AKP’s worldview is influenced by two elements simultaneously – Islam and liberalism- 
creating a powerful synthesis.”28 The AKP emerged out of the pro-Islamic political background 
and formed a majority party for the first time. The AKP was established with a focus on 
democracy and human rights values. “New legislation was adopted that would not normally be 
expected from a party that was being described as Islamist. This new legislation in areas such as 
privatization, promotion of foreign investment, human rights, and democracy was in line with 
both the infrastructure and superstructure of globalization.”29 Moreover, AKP has made 
reference to Islamic norms and values to mobilize broader political support for democratic 
legitimacy. The AKP drew significant support from non-secular Turkish citizens in the general 
elections of 2002 and came to power in Turkey.  
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The AKP has adapted a new Turkish foreign policy. “The AKP embraced political 
liberalism, even though it was based in conservative’s towns (the Anatolian bourgeoisie) and had 
its root in the Welfare Party, an Islamist party.”30 The AKP's strategy to achieve political 
legitimacy in the domestic realm has been accompanied by a new foreign policy. Since in power, 
the AKP actively pushed through the reform packages called for by the European Union (EU). 
Furthermore, the AKP has introduced multidimensional foreign policies that, today, Ankara 
pursues. The multidimensional aspect of the foreign policy has focused primarily on neighboring 
countries and regions. “One dimension of this new foreign policy approach concerned relations 
with the East, particularly the Middle East, concerns were raised about a so-called “axis shift” in 
Turkish foreign policy. This led to a debate as to whether Turkey is shifting its axis by turning 
away from the West and gradually turning towards the Middle East.”31 The leadership of the 
AKP - under Abdullah Gul, Ahmet Davutoglu and Recep Tayyip Erdogan - demonstrates a 
renewed zeal for involvement in the affairs of the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasus and 
Central Asia. AKP’s successive electoral victories under Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gul in the 2002, 
2007, and 2011 national elections show the extent to which his conservative modernity has been 
accepted with a new sense of Turkey's standing in the geopolitics of the 21st century.
32
 Using the 
Islamist discourse, this influential policy advances a new vision of Turkey as playing a decisive 
role as a participant in an emerging multi-dimensional world order.
33
 Islamism indicates the 
tradition and inspiration of political ideas in the Arab world. Turkey’s notion of historical 
identity is that interconnected to its foreign policy. Thus, the Ottomanism has been taking center 
stage in contemporary Turkish foreign policy and public diplomacy. 
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Ahmet Davutoglu had been the architect of the AKP government’s foreign policy since 
his nomination as chief adviser to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2002 and as 
ambassador in 2003. In 2009, he became the foreign minister and put into practice the doctrine –
strategic Depth- for Turkey’s engagement with the world in the new millennium.34 The main 
thesis of Davutoglu’s theory, as he described it in his book ‘Strategic Depth’ is that a nation’s 
value in world politics is predicated on its geo-strategic location and historic depth. Based on this 
theory, Turkey is uniquely endowed with both because of its location in geopolitical areas of 
influence, particularly its control of the Bosporus, and its historical legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire. Davutoglu emphasizes Turkey’s connections to the Balkans, the Middle East and even 
Central Asia and argues that Turkey is the natural heir to the Ottoman Empire that once unified 
the Muslim world and therefore has the potential to become a Muslim regional power. Neo-
Ottomanism, as manifested in the ‘Strategic Depth’ doctrine, has become a significant feature of 
Turkish foreign policy.
35
 As a result of this change in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's widening 
strategic foreign policy has focused on not only the traditional alliance with Europe but also with 
the Middle East and Africa. Since 2002, Turkey has increased diplomatic engagements with the 
Middle East and Africa in order to expand of the boundaries of Turkish foreign policy. 
As Mr. Erdogan has stated, "Turkey's geopolitical position, rich historical heritage, 
cultural depth, well-educated young population, ever-strengthening democracy, growing 
economy, and constructive foreign policy make it an indispensable country in a world 
transformed by rapid globalization."
36
 Over the past few years, Ankara has established close ties 
with the Muslim world. This new activism is an important departure from previous Turkish 
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foreign policy.
37
 Turkey's recent focus on the Middle East, however, does not mean that Turkey 
is about to turn its back on the West. Nor is the shift evidence of the "creeping Islamization" of 
Turkish foreign policy.
38
 Under AKP foreign policy, Turkey is rediscovering the region of which 
it has historically been an integral part. Additionally, it is important for Turkish foreign policy to 
continue with the necessary reforms that have been stalled for the past two years and proceed 
without delay to implement its commitments towards the EU. 
According to Abdullah Gul in 2004, Turkey’s role in changing the Middle East 
environment is a function of what it represents in this volatile geography as a European, 
democratic, and secular country that is attached firmly to the principles of a free-market 
economy and has a valuable and unique experience in implementing reform, modernity, and 
regional cooperation. Turkey's posture in the Middle East is now composed of becoming a 
regional leader, regional protector, bridge, model, and mediator and taking on a liberalizing 
role.
39
 This new vision for the justification of global politics and the new outlook of Turkish 
foreign policy, under the AKP administration, has propelled Turkey into the heart of regional 
politics in the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa.
40
 
      CHAPTER IV 
 
Turkey - EU Relations: A Journey without an Arrival! 
 
In this chapter, I analyze Turkey’s unresolved full membership relationship with the 
European Union (EU) under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, 
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AKP) government since 2002. Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe since the Council 
was founded in May 1949. Turkey’s journey to join the European Economic Community (EEC) 
began with its associate membership application to the ECC in July 1959, following the 
establishment of the ECC in 1958. The Ankara Association Agreement was signed in 1963 
between the Republic of Turkey and the ECC with the aim toward the accession of Turkey into 
the EEC. Turkey is the longest standing applicant to the EU with many ups and downs during an 
unsettled negotiation process. 
Turkey applied for full membership to the European Community (EC) in April 1987, 
which was replaced by the EU in 1992. Turkey is the only candidate state that has not yet begun 
accession negotiations. Enduring obstacles with additional protocols and the EU’s unfulfilled 
political expectations prolonged Turkey’s full membership in the EU. Besides the slow moving 
process membership, Turkey still remains without a clear timetable for EU accession. “In all the 
other countries, the political and economic process accelerated as the EU provided clearer signals 
to their accession. In the Turkish context, it has not been easy to sustain the political and 
economic process given the ambivalent, slow track relationship with the EU.”41 This long and 
tiring journey has caused Turkey to rethink the EU accession process.  
In recent years, numerous theories have emerged regarding Turkey’s modern foreign 
policy toward the West, particularly the European Union (EU), for example it has been referred 
to as: ‘axis of shift’ and ‘Turkey is turning its face away from EU’ and ‘does Christian Europe 
accept Muslim Turkey into the European Union?.’ Contrary to the arguments that Turkey has 
begun to move away from the West and the EU under the AKP governments since 2002, this 
thesis asserts that Turkey has not moved away from the EU and the West but is simply 
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rediscovering the East. Although the EU negotiation process slowed down, Turkey remains 
committed to the objective of EU accession while it has improved relations in the East, with both 
Muslim and non-Muslim states. Turkey does not dispute the constitutive norms of the Western-
centric international environment, yet it trying to help fix the existing system in such a way as to 
much better reflect its concerns and priorities at home and abroad.
42 
Europeans question the suitability of Turkey’s accession to the EU. However, Turkey’s 
membership in the EU has been challenged by the European states for decades. In this regard, 
Turks view the Middle East as an alternative strategic destination rather than Turkey perpetually 
knocking on the EU’s door and seeks a desire for a leadership in the Middle East. “Turkey no 
longer indexes its policies solely to the wishes of its western partners, as it has increasingly 
become clearer that Turkey’s concerns over its territorial integrity.”43 In response to that, the 
Turkish government under AKP, adopted the ‘Turkey-centric view’ approach to cope with these 
challenges. The Turkey-centric approach is an important factor in highlighting Turkey’s needs to 
transform to consideration of the liberal-democratic norms of the EU. Yet Turkish decision-
makers simultaneously underline that Turkey should be in the driver’s seat of this transformation 
and should adjust the pace and intensity of such reforms according to its ability to digest them.  
In 1997, Turkey was not given candidate status at the Luxemburg Summit, when the 
Central and Eastern European countries along with Cyprus and Malta were given candidate 
status. While the EU started negotiations with some of these countries, Turkey was not put on the 
list of candidate countries, which led to question about the role of cultural identity in relations 
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between Turkey and the EU.
44
 Is the EU a Christian Club? Does Turkey’s future belong in 
Europe or in the Middle East? “Are the West’s ‘globalized’ values in fact western rather than 
universal, and rooted in specifically western culture and historical evolution – its Christian roots, 
or the Renaissance, for example?”45 Some Europeans worry that bringing a large Muslim 
Turkey, a nation of nearly 77 million Muslims, formally into Europe will compromise the 
continent’s Christian character and heritage. Increasingly, it is believed that the EU will never 
open its door to a large Muslim country like theirs, and Turks are tired of reforming ‘for 
Europe’s sake.’46 After September 11, the concept of civilization has become more religious, 
while previously it was more cultural and historic.
47
 
After September 11, there has been a rising tension between the West and the Muslim 
world and there has been increasing Islamophobia in Western society.
48
 Europeans worry that 
Islam will make it difficult for Muslims to accept many of the continent’s secular core values, 
such as tolerance, democracy and equal rights for women. European decision makers give 
reference to God or Christianity from the EU Constitution, which demonstrates that the continent 
has a strong Christian bias. Vatican opposed Turkish membership in the EU under Pope Benedict 
XVI. However, perhaps, the new Pope Francis is more open minded, although his statement 
about the ‘alleged’ Armenian genocide issue caused tension in Ankara. “The pope condemned 
the 1915 killings of Armenians by Turks as genocide – comments that drew the anger of Ankara 
– but urged reconciliation with Turkey, as well as with neighboring Azerbaijan.”49 Francis urged 
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both Armenia and Turkey to lay aside their differences and strive to be peacemakers. Pope 
Francis said: "Cherish the great wisdom of your elders and strive to be peacemakers: not content 
with the status quo, but actively engaged in building the culture of encounter and 
reconciliation."
50
  
For many, such as Sarkozy, Turkey’s efforts to promote peace in the Middle East 
may be praiseworthy but do not constitute a reason to back Turkey’s EU 
membership. Muslim countries may be inclined to listen to Ankara more than 
Brussels in view of the cultural, historical, and religious bonds tying Turkey to the 
Middle East, but this proves only that Turkey can be a useful ally rather than 
member of the EU.
51
  
 
Pope Benedict XVI, while he was still Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, called EU 
negotiations with Turkey ‘an enormous mistake.’ The EU was founded by 
Christian Democrats like Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, 
and many of their heirs still see it as a “Christian Club.” That image would be 
much harder to maintain if the club’s biggest member were a Muslim state. Many 
would agree that the European Union is in fact a Christian club – if by “Christian” 
we mean a culture profoundly shaped by Christian, and particularly Roman 
Catholic, ideas and practices. Others freely admit that the divide between the EU 
and Turkey is in fact a cultural gap – one large enough for former French 
President Valerie Giscard d’Estaing to state that “Turkey is not a European 
country,” EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein to warn of the coming Islamization 
of Europe and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to assert “the superiority 
of [European] civilization” over that of “Islamic countries.” For these and other 
European leaders, culture matters and Turkey is simply forcing Europe to realize 
it.
 52
 
 
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government is in favor of full membership 
in the EU, although there have been many challenges and setbacks in its journey for full 
membership.  The growing rift between Turkey and the EU is best illustrated by the 
words of Turkey’s Minister of State and Chief Negotiator for the EU, Egemen Bagis. He 
said that “the EU is today under the risk of being overtaken by a racist mentality that 
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cannot internalize its own values and emulates the fascist methods of the 1930s.”53 The 
long negotiation process has caused reluctance by Turkish government. But, the 
prominent figures of the AKP have reaffirmed several times that EU membership has 
been maintained as a priority of Turkish foreign policy.
54
 On June 22
nd
, 2016, Turkish 
President Erdogan said; “Europe, you don’t want us –Turkey- because the majority of our 
population are Muslim…we knew it but we tried to show our sincerity.”55 Joining the EU 
is not just a Turkish foreign policy but it is about identity and perceptions. The reshaping 
of the world in recent years seems to place the EU and Turkey in different camps.  
Turkey’s full Cyprus membership negotiation process continues with challenges 
and the EU’s ambivalent approach. There are also issues regarding Cyprus and Turkish-
Armenian relations and the EU-Turkey Refugee Pact (known as refuges deal). This refers 
to visa-free travel for Turks in the EU in exchange for a refugee deal over Iraqi and 
Syrian refugees going through Turkey to the EU. The fact is that despite Turkey’s 
overtures, the two neighborhood questions that lie close to the heart and political 
dynamics of Turkey’s accession process – Cyprus and Armenia- remain unsolved.  
1. Turkey-Cyprus and the EU 
The Cyprus conflict represented the single most important issue in Turkey’s EU 
accession process with the start of negotiations on October 3, 2005.
56
 The decades old 
conflict in Cyprus and Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean Sea have long represented 
an obstacle to Turkey’s European integration. An analysis of the negotiations from 2005 
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was published in the Brussel’s Summit on December 17, 2008. “In this declaration, the 
EU stated that the UN Secretary’s General was pleased with the Turkish contribution to 
the efforts to solve the Cyprus issue. However, the Council, along with the Commission 
on behalf of 25 states, called Turkey to complete the negotiations to adapt the Ankara 
agreement, establishing an association between the European Economic Community and 
Turkey.”57  
After this declaration in 2008, Turkey’s relationship with the EU became more 
complicated than ever. In this complexity, the EU presented itself as a party to the Cyprus issue 
and made it unsolvable, although the EU was supposed to assume a moderating and unbiased 
role in its solution. Furthermore, Turkey cannot be a member of the EU until it recognizes all of 
Cyprus – both the Northern, Turkish Cypriot and the Southern, Greek Cypriot -, pursuant to 
international law and agreements to which Turkey is a signatory. 
The Turkish Cypriot community has a legal right to negotiate from a status of 
equality with the Greek Cypriot community in the current attempt, under the 
auspices of the Secretary-General, to reach a workable political solution for the 
unfortunate situation in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot has never had the right to 
assert sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriot people without their consent. Nor, 
from the moment of the Greek Cypriot unilaterally rejected the constitutional 
basis on which the legitimacy of the Cypriot government rested in international 
law, has the Greek Cypriot regime has any right to assert sovereignty over the 
island. Since that time practical necessity has created two governments on 
Cyprus. The rights of the peoples of the two communities to determine their own 
political futures have remained unchanged and in all are equal. The Security 
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) have recognized and 
consistently reaffirmed these rights, as have the two communities themselves in 
their interim negotiated agreements. Under these circumstances, international law 
does not sanction differential treatment of the two communities in the current 
negotiations or in any resulting settlement. If these efforts to establish a federal 
government of Cyprus - with equal participation and mutual acceptance of the two 
community should fail, each regime the Turkish Cypriot no less than the Greek 
Cypriot -   would be eligible for recognition as an independent state. Such 
                                                          
57
 Narli and Kuntay, 34 
28 
 
recognition by other states would not then infringe any principle of international 
law.
58
 
 
When the EU included Cyprus in its enlargement policy, the conflict escalated the 
dynamics of Turkey’s own accession process.  The entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU 
in 2004 has poisoned EU-Turkey relations to an unprecedented extent. Thus, this complicated 
decision by the EU, blocked the way to a solution rather than contributing to the settlement of the 
Cyprus issue. The Republic of Cyprus has vetoed half a dozen chapters in Turkey’s accession 
negotiations. A further eight chapters have been frozen by the EU because of Turkey’s non-
implementation of the additional protocol extending the EU-Turkey customs union agreement to 
Cyprus. Thus, a solution in Cyprus has become a condition for Turkey’s EU membership. 
“Greek Cypriot tactics to block both Turkey’s accession talks and the commission’s direct trade 
regulation to lift the isolation of northern Cyprus are considered to be evidence that EU should 
have never accepted Cyprus’ EU membership prior to resolution of the conflict.”59 Moreover, 
France has insisted on a ‘privileged partnership’ status for Turkey and it has blocked the opening 
of five titles on the grounds that they were directly related to membership.
60
 The negotiation 
process has slowed down increasingly because of these obstacles. 
2. Turkey-Armenia and the EU 
Another challenge in the EU accession process is Turkey’s relationship with Armenia. 
Historically, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish-Armenian relations have been 
tense because of the so-called Armenian genocide of 1915. Armenia has close relations with the 
EU because of the ‘European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).’ Moreover, the Armenian Diaspora 
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has extensive power and influence in the EU and the United States (USA). For instance, The 
Armenian Diaspora has made a great effort to have the U.S. Congress recognize the alleged 
Armenian Genocide. Furthermore, some of the EU states already recognized the ‘alleged’ 
Armenian-genocide issue. Therefore, recognition of the Armenian genocide increased contention 
between Turkey and several EU member states, including France, Italy, Greece, Belgium, and 
Sweden. The German parliament recognized the alleged Armenian genocide on June 2, 2016. 
Moreover, Pope Francis called the killings a genocide last year.
61
 The European parliament 
recognized the Armenian genocide in resolutions in 1987, 2000, 2002, and 2005, complicating 
Turkey’s relations with EU institutions.62 The member states of the EU, the U.S. and other 
countries put enormous pressure on the matter by recognizing the alleged Armenian genocide 
rather than encouraging the building of a strong relationship between Turkey and Armenia.  
Since the AKP came in power in 2002, there has been improvement in Turkish-Armenian 
relations. Former president Abdullah Gul made a landmark visit to Armenia regarding ‘promises 
of hope for the future.’ This was the first time in the two nation’s history that a Turkish leader 
visited the country, following Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s invitation to attend the 
soccer match.
63
 Mr. Sargsyan said Armenia and Turkey would work together to solve regional 
conflicts, “we are going to resolve the issues and not pass them on to next generations.”64 
Turkey’s effort showed great improvement with Armenia and Turkey’s neighbors. Therefore, the 
Armenian genocide should be considered a foreign policy issue between the two nations rather 
than being focus of the EU and others.  
3. Turkey – ‘Refugee Deal’ and the EU 
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In 2016, the current issue, regarding Turkey’s full membership in the EU is about the 
refugee deal which is an accord between the EU and the Turkish government that went into 
effect in March 2015. The EU offered Turkey a deal for cooperation in stemming the flow of 
migrants to Greece and to the EU. Under the deal, Greece can send migrants back to Turkey and 
Turkey agreed to stop more boats and the flow of migrants to Europe. In exchange, the EU 
pledged 3 billion euros ($3.2 billion as of October, 2016) in aid to refugees in Turkey and agreed 
to resettle more Syrians refugees and speed up visa liberalization for Turks and Turkey’s 
membership in the EU. Turkey is currently home to about three millions Syrian refugees.
65
 
Hundreds of thousands of these refugees would flow to Europe if Turkey did not prevent them 
from traveling to Europe. The President of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan, made clear that Turkey has 
taken in 3 million refugees, whereas the EU’s only concern is keeping them out of its territory. 
Ankara sees that the visa-free deal reached between Turkey and the EU would be perceived as a 
first step toward eventual Turkish membership in the EU. 
Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said the deal with the EU stipulated that all 
Turks would get visa freedom in October 2016, “It can’t be that we – Ankara- implement 
everything that is good for the EU but Turkey gets nothing in return.”66 Yet, most of the key 
provisions of the deal were barely implemented. The EU launched an aid program of more than 
$375 million, targeting a million of the neediest Syrians in Turkey giving them the debit cards, 
called the Kizilay card (Turkish ‘Red Crescent’). Recipients of the cards are being chosen based 
on need, according to the EU Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Christos Stylianides.
67
 Sarvepalli 
Radhakrishnan, an Indian philosopher and statesman, - the president of Indian from 1962 to 
1967- explained the realpolitik principle with the analogy “it is good when I steal your cow, and 
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bad when you steal my cow which has been the governing force of European relations for all 
these four or five centuries. Self-interest is the end; brute-force, the means; conscience is 
taboo.”68 
Hans J. Morgenthau argued that interest is at the heart of all politics and thus on 
the international stage it behooved each state to pursue its national interest, 
generally defined as power. The national interest as their attainment is necessary 
for the nation’s survival. The animus dominandi, the desire to dominate, is the 
social force that determines political activity. On the international plane, those 
behavioral patterns translate into policies of the status quo, imperialism, and 
prestige. The first has as its objective the maintenance of the existing balance of 
power, whereas the second seeks to acquire more power and the third seeks to 
show off strength in order to keep or expand power. Remember always that it is 
not only a political necessity, but also a moral duty for a nation to always follow 
in its dealings with other nations but one guiding star, one standard for thought, 
one rule for action: The National Interest. Consequently, the necessary elements 
of the national interest have a tendency to swallow up the variable elements so 
that in the end all kinds of objectives, actual or potential, are justified in terms of 
national survival.
69
 
 
Turkey’s long time ambitions to join the EU has been encouraged by the latest Syrian 
migrants deal. However, this deal has been delayed because of a dispute over Turkish anti-
terrorism legislation. European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker emphasizes that if all 
the conditions are fulfilled, Turkey can win visa-free travel to the EU. While big declines in 
refugee numbers followed the Turkey pact -refugee deal, - the EU toughened its rhetoric on 
Turkey’s membership prospect. Meanwhile, Turkey is facing multiple serious national security 
threats which include the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS or ISIL) presence in neighboring 
Syria and other terrorist organization such as Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), are issues in 
Turkey’s mainly Kurdish southeast. Turkey launched its biggest military operation in Syria on 
August 24, 2016 aiming to force ISIS away from its borders and deter further advances by Syrian 
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Kurds allied with PKK and some other terrorists’ organizations. Moreover, Ankara declared a 
three-month state of emergency. Therefore, Ankara cannot soften and adjust its anti-terrorism 
law at this point in time because of the national security situations in the country simply be 
request from Brussels. National interests are paramount when it is the concern of the country’s 
national security. “Statecraft, as its name suggests, is nothing more than the art of success, 
applied to the specific ends of the state.”70  
The EU leaders turned to Ankara for help after almost a million people flowed into 
Greece in 2015. In late July, 2016, Ankara made a statement that Turkey could back out of its 
agreement with the EU if it does not receive visa-free travel for its citizens by October. However, 
there is no sign of reaching the agreement between Brussels and Ankara about the visa 
liberalization deal and the deal is not off the table yet either. Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesperson for 
the Turkish President, Mr. Erdogan, complained what is clear is that the EU gave Turkey the 
cold shoulder regarding the Turkey- EU migration deal. The EU risks alienating a major ally 
while the EU membership remains s strategic goal for Turkey; it takes two to tango.
71
 Brussel’s 
cooperation with Ankara can make substantial progress on Turkey’s full membership in the EU. 
Therefore, both Turkey and the EU could continue benefiting from working together as major 
allies. 
Turkey balances its relations with the EU by strengthening its relations with non-Western 
actors whenever this is considered to be in Turkey’s national interests. Under the ruling AKP, 
Turkey is adopting a free-market economy and liberal democracy on one hand and fostering 
interdependent relations with the EU on the other hand. The AKP has maintained considerable 
economic growth with the EU in the past decade. In 2015, Turkey was the European Union’s 
                                                          
70
 http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/the-real-origins-realpolitik-9933 
71
 http://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-youve-got-a-problem-failed-coup-fethullah-gulen-recep-tayyip-erdogan-
erdogan/ 
33 
 
fourth-largest export market and sixth-largest source of imports.
72
 Greater wealth provides future 
investment opportunities in both directions. Thus, the Western world and Turkey are strategically 
intertwined in economic success. A more prosperous Turkey is likely to remain stable in the 
region and anchored to the West as a reliable and supportive ally to reinforce the Turkish-EU 
bonds. In 2011, The AKP has set 2023 goals and Mr. Erdogan announced the ‘2023 Visions’ 
consisting of specific economic goals leading up to the country’s centennial in 2023. Mr. 
Erdogan’s vision outlines targets and major improvement in the areas of economic activity, 
energy, health care and transport as well as democratic reforms. At the G-20 Antalya Summit, 
Turkey was able to provide concrete frameworks for public-private cooperation for investing in 
financial and developmental efforts. Turkey was successful in mainstreaming the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in all activities throughout its G-20 presidency.
73
 According to this 
vision, Turkey is becoming an advanced economy by 2023- an economic powerhouse – the 
world’s 10th largest economy.74 
Turkey, under AKP government, has begun to pursue a transformative foreign policy in 
its region whose fundamental premises are to contribute to regional integration and 
interdependence.  Turkey’s location explains its own historic importance, between Europe and 
the Asia –Middle East, the Turkic world and the Ottoman region. Therefore, Turkey’s culturally, 
historically, economically and politically links to these diverse worlds’ forms its foreign policy 
for these regions. In the same vein, similar to China’s ‘peaceful rise / peaceful development’ 
strategy, Turkey tries to contribute to the emergence of a friendly regional environment through 
the adoption of soft-power tools.
75
 Turkey plays a crucial role in linking the EU to wider areas of 
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Eurasia. “Turkish government has been telling the EU that it cannot hope to have a credible 
policy in the Middle East without Turkey on board.  Turkey has all the tools necessary to 
guarantee the EU a greater presence in the region – an European goal since the foundation of its 
common Foreign and security policy.”76 Turkey has a strategic location between the West and 
Asia. If Turkey is to be a full member of the EU, this would facilitate more cooperative relations 
in the regions for both the EU and Turkey. 
Conclusion 
Turkey has aimed at becoming a member of the EU since 1963. However, the EU was 
reluctant to accept Turkey’s EU membership under a different pretext in every period during the 
EU accession process. Turkish governing elites generally considered Turkey as being within 
European borders culturally and accept ‘European values’ as the basic criteria for the 
civilization.
77
 From this point of view, is the EU willing to admit Turkey into the European club? 
Turkey’s accession to join the EU involves many obstacles and many of them are not directly 
related to EU membership. The EU should play an advisory role particularly in Cyprus and 
Armenian issues rather than as a third actor in the process. Germany and France took a negative 
stance toward Turkey’s membership to the EU. France under Sarkozy questioned Turkey’s 
credentials - the idea that Turkey did not belong in Europe - for becoming even a member of the 
EU. Moreover, some of the EU member states question the full membership of Turkey, whose 
population is almost entirely Muslim, because of cultural and religious identity. The best remedy 
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is inclusivity of Turkey’s full membership to the EU. The AKP is not shifting Turkish Foreign 
policy from the West to the East. Turkey is simply expanding its foreign policy.
78
 
The EU is increasingly being perceived as an inward looking continent on decline, which 
is becoming xenophobic and defensive.
79
 Following the end of the Cold War, the former socialist 
East European countries had started to pursue ‘a return to Europe’ policy and this major shift in 
international politics changed the EU’s priorities and the significance of Turkey’s geostrategic 
role for the EU. Turkey’s traditional role in the Cold War era disappeared, and the EU started to 
increasingly engage with the newly independent East European states.
80
 However, as a major 
country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple 
regional identities that cannot be reduced to one, unified category.  
Turkey’s inclusion in the EU would give strategic support to European states to lessen 
tensions in the current Middle East, particularly the Syrian and Iraqi refugee situations. In this 
context, Turkey could host, employ and ultimately – if necessary- absorb its swelling Syrian 
refugee population, making Turkey a more resilient country in its own right and a stronger 
neighbor and partner for Europe.
81
 For the first time, Turkey began to use soft power in foreign 
policy tools such as economics, human rights, identity, dialogue and civil administration as 
opposed to the hard power instruments such as military.
82
 More to the point: to have one of the 
world’s most important Muslim states anchored in Europe as a wealthy, tolerant democracy, and 
bordering states like Iraq, Syria and Iran, would send effective message to the rest of the Islamic 
world. 
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Since the EU rebuffed Turkey’s application in 1989, the governing leaders, at the time, 
were unable to obtain a clear EU membership path for Turkey. If the EU had provided more 
incentives and encouragements for Turkey’s full membership, Turkish leaders, led by Turgut 
Ozal at that time, might have implemented more political reforms that might have changed the 
nature of the current relations between the EU and Turkey a long time ago. When the AKP 
started to govern Turkey, since 2002, the pace of reforms accelerated significantly and as a 
result, Turkey was able to make a number of constitutional amendments and administrative 
improvements. Turkish foreign policy has displayed a major transformation since the EU entered 
a slowdown in the membership process in 2005 and 2006. The EU placed more emphasis on 
sanctions and setbacks in its approach to Turkey – sticks more than carrots - and implemented a 
confrontational style rather than conciliatory one.
83
 The AKP government has not changed 
previous Turkish foreign policies toward the EU. However, it is clear that AKP has increased its 
efforts to deepen Turkey’s relations with the EU. In this context, the latest ‘refugee deal’ Pact - 
between Turkey and the EU - is proof of improvement to seek another opportunity to gain a full 
membership status in the EU.  
De facto, Turkey is a European country for centuries anyway, whether Turkey is 
officially become a full member status in the EU or not. Turkey is a ‘founding’ member of the 
Council of Europe, a member of the EU, Customs Union, member of European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), member of UEFA -the Union of European Football Associations and the 
governing body of football in Europe and there are many international treaties along with high 
volume of trade partnership between Turkey and the EU. Turkey is more European than most 
people in Europe in terms of the kinds of attire of people, the cultural offerings, economic 
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developments and commercialization on the high streets. Many European institutions and events 
include Turkey in their scope. For example, Turkey won Eurovision in 2003, Istanbul was 
European Capital of Culture in 2010 and European Capital of Sports for 2012. I believe Turkey's 
European credentials outweigh its non-European qualities. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Turkey’s Engagement with Middle East and Turkic States: 
Ottomanism and Islamic Identity 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the historical continuities and changes in Turkey’s foreign 
policy engagement with the Middle East and Turkic states. I highlight the correlation between 
the Turkish foreign policy and Ottoman - Islamic identity, under the Ottoman Empire people – 
the millet – system. The Ottoman Empire’s social structure – the millet system - was based on the 
religious and cultural autonomy of different communities rather than particular ethnic groups and 
languages. Each millet was recognized as a legal community under its own religious leadership. 
“The Ottoman Empire spread itself across three continents and included Turkey, Transylvania, 
Transcaucasia and Caucasus, the Crimea, southern Ukraine, the countries that now make up the 
states of Romania,  Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon, a part of Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, Tunisia and Algeria. There were at 
least 36 different races of people and three major religious groups; Muslims, Jews and Christians 
lived within the empire.”84 Although non-Muslims enjoyed the religious freedoms within the 
millet system, they were confined to certain boundaries and were subject to pool taxes.
85
 Loyalty 
was a major dynamic behind the Ottoman state system. 
The Ottoman Sultan, the Caliph, -the successor of the prophet Mohammed - was accepted 
as the head of the Muslims – a worldwide Islamic community known as Ummah. Ottomanism 
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aimed to provide equal rights and duties, including freedom of thought and faith, to both 
Muslims and non-Muslims, thus creating an Ottoman nation in order to preserve the empire’s 
unity.
86
 Within this context, I examine the relevance of Turkey’s unique experience for Arab 
successor states of the Ottoman Empire in the contemporary Middle East and Turkic states. The 
emergence of Turkish consciousness paved the way for the notion of being a Turk as compatible 
with the concepts of Ottomanism and Islam. Foreign policy becomes as efficient tool for 
constructing a national identity of a state.
87
 
There were huge territories in the Middle East and the Balkans ruled by the Ottoman 
Empire for centuries. The Political legitimacy of the Ottoman state was based on its ability to 
defend the ummah and maintain its welfare within the territory of Islam. The Ottoman Sultan 
was associated with being God’s loyal servant and this territory was anchored to the life-giving 
homeland.
88
 Therefore, Turkey has a special geographic location and geopolitical status in 
between the East and the West. According to the Koran, all Muslims comprise a single 
community –ummah- : “Verily, this ummah of yours is a single ummah, and I am your lord and 
cherisher: therefore, serve me.”89 Islamic political perception is associated with the unity of 
ummah rather than ethnic and racial differences. Ahmet Davutoglu,
90
 suggests in his published 
books that Islamic identity is ontological rather than social. Davutoglu states, “the oneness of 
ummah depends on the common ontological approach of its members rather than on linguistic, 
geographic, cultural or biological factors and is directly connected to the concept of Allah and to 
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the specific image originating from this belief in tawhid.”91 Loyalty to the Ottoman Empire was 
considered a part of the Muslim faith and culture. This perception was used by both elites and 
intellectuals to establish a firm foundation for the ideology of Ottomanism.
92
 The following map 
illustrates the last remnants of the Ottoman Empire in the years before the foundation of the 
modern Republic of Turkey. 
 
Map 1.
93
 1920 National Pact – Misak-i Milli- designated territories (Figure 1 - map a -) for a 
Turkish nation, 1914-1920. Conceptual map based on the claims of the Misak-i Milli with known 
territorial borders from 1914,1918, 1920 and even 1878 (Batumi). 
 
 
The National Pact of Turkey – Misak-i Milli- was announced by the last term of 
the Ottoman Parliament in 1920, with some major exceptions, such as Western 
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Thrace and districts of Mosul and Iskenderun. In contrast to Germany, Austria, 
Hungary and Bulgaria who lost World War I and accepted the agreements 
enforced by the Entente Powers. The Turkish nationalists waged a war against the 
implementation of the Serves Treaty. Furthermore, Turkish nationalists’ refusal to 
accept territorial losses in Anatolia
94
and their signing of a new peace treaty as a 
result of a military victory in the National Liberation War was the crucial 
difference between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states, which gained their 
independence without a major military confrontation in the boundaries drawn by 
colonial powers. This distinctive feature had a major impact on the politics of 
Turkey and its foreign policy.
95
 
 
The Republic of Turkey was established and its borders were recognized as a result of 
signing the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24
th
, 1923. Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East and 
its influence in the region based on Turkey’s historic role stems from the legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire. Mr. Erdogan routinely references Ottomans, the Seljuks, a Turkic group that preceded 
the Ottomans in the Middle East, and also pre-Islamic Turkic peoples like Gokturks, Avars, and 
Karakhanids.
96
 More recently, the President of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan higlighted Turkey’s 
historical connection with the issue of Mosul, referring to Turkey’s military campaign in the 
liberation of Mosul, which Turkey has insisted on playing a role in the battle to retake Mosul 
from the Islamic State, a terrorist organization ( ISIS, ISIL or DAESH). The battle for Mosul’s 
liberation started on Monday, October 17
th
, 2016. Mosul is Iraq’s second-largest city. ISIS seized 
it more than two years ago.
97
 President Erdogan said “when Western powers divided the former 
Ottoman lands of the Middle East, at the end of the World War I, we –Turkey- did not 
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voluntarily accept the borders of our country” and Mr. Erdogan also referred to the last Ottoman 
Parliament, Mosul as part of Turkey.
98
  
Mustafa Akgun, the director of the Global Political Trends Center in Turkey, said that for 
Turks “there is an emotional side to the issue, referring to Mosul, a century ago, that place was 
Turkey. A big geography was Turkey. It is committed in the memories that British and French 
imperialism was responsible.”99 Furthermore, Mr. Erdogan criticized the Treaty of Lausanne, 
which created the borders of the modern Republic of Turkey, for leaving the country too small. 
He spoke of the country’s interest in the fate of Turkish minorities living beyond these borders, 
as well as historic claims to Mosul.
100
 “We [Turkey] have a historical responsibility in the 
region. Our most important task is to teach this to a new generation. If we want to be both at the 
table and in the field, there is a reason.”101 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of Republic of 
Turkey, said that the ‘national border’ did not refer only to Turks: “During the demarcation and 
fixing of the borders, we claimed that our national border runs to the south of Iskenderun, and 
includes Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah by extending to the East. This is our national frontier 
line.”102 The following map illustrates the curerent border of the country, where the orange 
segments represent the revised borders of Turkey under Misak-i Milli pact (1920).  
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Map 2.
103
 1920 National Pact – Misak-i Milli- designated territories (Figure 2- map b-) for 
Republic of Turkey, 2016. 
 
Nicholas Spykman’s theory of Rimland explains the importance of geography. 
Geopolitics is the planning of the security policy of a country in terms of its geographical factors. 
His view is, “who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of 
the world.”104 Turkey is centered in a strategically critical and important region; its geography is 
an inescapable reality for Turkey and unchanging factor in international relations. The demand 
for Turkey to regain its former geography has remained the same for centuries. Thus, Turkey’s 
strategic value of its position determines its foreign policy and security decisions. “In a world of 
international anarchy, foreign policy must aim at least the preservation of the relative power 
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position of the state. Power is in the last instance the ability to wage successful war, and in 
geography lie the clues to the problems of military and political strategy.”105 William Hale 
argues that for a state of its size and strength, Turkey had to deal with an extraordinary range of 
international questions, mainly due to its geopolitical location. 
Islamic political identity also provides a cognitive bridge between interest and action, 
society and state, and tradition and modernity in much of the Islamic world.
106
 Politically active 
Muslims in Turkey evoked Islamic symbols, discourse and institutions to express their notions of 
community and identity. They utilized Islam in Turkey to promoted new understanding for the 
cultural order, especially through the participation in social movements and related political 
parties. This new culture with the themes of equality, justice, identity and solidarity became the 
center for the Islamic oriented movements. Islam facilitates participation in social life and serves 
as a source of solidarity. Islam has such popular appeal because of the effectiveness of Islamic 
leaders and networks in mobilizing large sections of the populace in pursuit of social justice and 
political representation.  
The relationship between Islam, nationalism and the Islamic tradition influenced the 
Islamic movements for Islamic political identity. Islam is a religion that seeks unity without 
negating differences for all diversity. There are not big differences in lifestyles within the 
Muslim world other than the national differences. Islam lies at the core structure of both Ottoman 
and Turkish society and it is the main source of shared moral values and understandings. 
“Islamic political identity is in the process of becoming conscious of the social and political 
effects of religiously molded frames of reference, and utilizing these frames as political means 
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for fulfilling worldly agenda. This transformation entails the strategic and conscious utilization 
of shared conceptions of ethics, justice, community and history to develop new methods for 
advancing tangible social and economic goals.”107 In this context, it is an inevitable reality that 
Turkey’s Ottoman heritage provides historical links with the Middle East and Turkic states.  
Throughout the Ottoman Empire’s history (1299-1922), religion served as a mediating 
cultural and political bridge between the state and society. The Ottoman Empire shared a frame 
of reference based on the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammed, which were used to 
define the notions of virtue and justice in society.
108
 The Ottoman state system was associated 
with the Sublime Porte (Bab-i Ali) central government of the Ottoman Empire. The key 
institution for the Sublime Porte in the Ottoman state was the child levy (devsirme) whereby the 
state raised the boys (ages 8 to 18) to become elites as military and bureaucratic leaders whose 
loyalty in theory was to the state and the objective fulfillment of its purpose. The Ottoman state 
established its own bureaucratic schools and trained the devsirme – recruited children- to execute 
the norms and rules of the state. This system allowed the Ottoman state to rule the Millet system, 
which controlled different religious communities by recognizing a large degree of autonomy in 
their intercommunal affairs. Thus, Islam was one of the main sources of social cohesion and 
important organizing set of norms for the horizontal ties of diverse communities under the Millet 
system. The primary task for the bureaucracy, in the Ottoman State system, was the preservation 
of the integrity of the Sultan - the state – and the promotion of Islam. Although Islam was an 
important part during the Ottoman Empire, the affairs of the Ottoman state were carried out 
according to the sovereign’s laws – known as kanun, which were seen as separate from Islamic 
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law (sharia). As a result of the kanun, an independent and secular legal system developed, 
complementing the sharia and its vision of virtuous and just order in the society.  
Islamic consciousness remained as the foundation of communal identity between large 
segments of society for centuries. Islam offered a more durable political community for Ottoman 
society. The policy of ‘Ottomanism’ was designed to minimize cultural, ethnic and religious 
differences within the diverse empire by giving strong legal protection to all groups along with a 
feeling of Ottoman citizenship.
109
 Turkish nationalism that incorporates Islam and Ottoman 
history is an essential aspect of modern Turkish national identity. There is a close link among 
Turkish national identity, culture and Islam, although Ataturk tried to separate Islam from 
Turkish nationalism and establish a secularist Turkish nationalism (known as Kemalism). Islam 
as a spiritual and communal influence positioned itself to enlighten some of the core values 
among the Muslim World. Thus, Islam became the means of communication and alliance 
formation for solidarity.  
Necip Fazil Kisakurek
110
 (1904-1983), the ideological father of Turkish-Islamic synthesis 
- began publishing the weekly ‘the Great East’ (Buyuk Dogu) in 1943. This weekly magazine 
called for the abolition of secularism and repeatedly praised the Ottoman Sultans. Kisakurek 
described the image of Buyuk Dogu – the Great East - as it continues a thorough, integrated faith, 
a worldview, and a poem of being’ that culminates in Islam. The essays were published in Buyuk 
Dogu magazine, collected under ‘the web of Ideology’ (Ideolocya Orgusu), which symbolizes 
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this framework and points to a model which engages the role of faith in public life.
111
 Since the 
late 1970s, Kisakurek has been an icon of Turkish Islamisim. Former president of Turkey, 
Abdullah Gul, and the current president of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan, and many readers of the AKP 
have been inspired by Kisakurek’s rhetoric. Mr. Erdogan recalled the joys of meeting Kisakurek 
and walking ‘the path’ alongside him. Mr. Erdogan described the poet’s life and works as a guide 
for himself and future generations.
112
  
Turkish-Islamic identity stemming from the country’s historical experiences in the 
Ottoman-Islamic past allows for a role to lead Turkish and Islamic world. In this context, the 
Turkish government can pursue a policy of Neo – Ottomanism to have Muslims feel at home, 
under a common Islamic identity and instill values for coexistence, regardless of national 
differences and geographic locations. Under the AKP, Turkey has legitimized historical 
reference has shifted to the Ottoman Empire.
113
 Abdullah Gul,
114
 then the Welfare Party’s (Refah 
Partisi) which represented the religious idea as a the political expression,  vice-chair, defined 
‘deeper Turkey’ as a dynamic idea of creating an honorable and powerful Turkey by linking the 
Anatolian bourgeoisie, Sufi orders, neighborhood associations and foundations.
115
 Identity 
dominates foreign policy. “Turkey’s Islamic identity has not prevented it from having a close 
interaction with the West and from being an important member of the Western institutions and 
organizations. We pursue and further develop our integration with the West on the basis of 
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mutual interest.”116 Abdullah Gul played a leading role in formulating Welfare Party (RP)’s 
foreign policy:  
Turkey is neither Luxembourg nor Bangladesh. History, geography and realities 
require Turkey to carry and fulfill a mission regardless of our desires. This 
mission or role may be the role of the Ottoman Empire. We therefore cannot 
remain indifferent to the developments in Palestine, Yugoslavia and Albania due 
to our national interest. Turkey is the cultural center of Islamic civilization in 
Europe. We [Turkey] therefore have to involve ourselves in the developments in 
the Balkans.
117
 
 
Mr. Erdogan’s identification (he associates himself with the spirit of Adnan Menderes in the 
1950s and Turgut Ozal in the 1980s) and constant appeal to Mr. Ozal’s policies resonated in 
rejuvenating Mr. Ozal’s legacy and utilize it to promote his new policies. Many Muslims who voted for 
the AKP in 2002 made connections with the restoration of the Mr. Ozal’s era. AKP’s identity emerged 
simultaneously with Turkish, Muslim and Western beliefs. The AKP government empowers and 
promotes the return of Muslims and Islamic ethics to the public sphere. The AKP has its roots in 
combining norms and values in Islamic political traditions.
118
 A survey by Istanbul’s Bosporus 
University conducted in late fall 2002, found that 90 percent of AKP voters prayed at least once a day 
and 99 percent fasted during the Ramadan. A total of 81 percent saw themselves as Muslim first and 
Turks second, while 60 percent said that religious values took precedence over national values, 
democracy, human rights and secularism.
119
 Islam remains an effective power and a strong cultural 
reference for the formation of Turkish identity as a Muslim country. “The AKP’s goal is to transform 
cultural values in such a way that religion as a political identity is acceptable, rather than to simply 
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reduce religion to an ideology.”120 The following quote is part of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan’s speech at the American Enterprise Institute, January 29, 2004. 
As a society, consisting predominantly of Muslims, Turkey will continue to make 
contributions toward disseminating and developing universal values in this region. 
Turkey feels this responsibility as a result of its democratic structure, rich 
historical legacy and identity, economic potential, and its membership in Western 
institutions. Moreover, these given [values] also shape Turkey’s national interests. 
To be successful in this endeavor, we are first establishing these values firmly at 
home, and will continue to do that. Turkey, a country which acts as a bridge 
between the East and the West, Islam and Christianity, as well as Europe and 
Asia, lives in harmony with traditions rooted in Islamic culture. In this sense, 
Turkey in its region and especially in the Middle East will be a guide in 
overcoming instability, a driving force for economic development, and a reliable 
partner in ensuring security. Our relations in the future should be developed with 
more substance and common understanding to facilitate the realization of the 
regional and global vision that we share. It is necessary for us to more carefully 
analyze the political and social development of societies as well as the role played 
by identity in domestic and foreign policy. In this vein, to better understand 
Muslim societies, a more objective view of Islam should be employed. That, the 
Turkish Society is predominantly Muslim, has not prevented Turkey from 
engaging in a comprehensive interaction with the West and from becoming an 
important member of Western institutions and organizations.
121
 
 
Ahmet Davutoglu - the former Prime Minister of Turkey (2014-2016) - is another 
important factor for Turkish foreign policy’s involvement, under AKP government, in the 
Middle East with his ‘strategic-depth’ and ‘zero problems with neighbors’ doctrines. These 
doctrines foresee an independent and visionary role for Turkey in its region. “Davutoglu brought 
an innovative framework to the Turkish foreign policy, a theoretical portrait for Turkey’s 
diplomacy, a vision of steady and systematic foundation.”122 The AKP government assumed the 
role of a regional power, during Davutoglu’s term as a Foreign Minister (2009-2014). The 
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Turkish government assumed the role of arbitrator in the region. Davutoglu, focused on the 
dispute between Israel and Palestine, Hamas and El-Fatah, EU- Iran, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo’s conflict with Serbia, the US-Iran dispute and the ongoing civil war in Somalia.123 He 
was motivated in turning Turkey into an international mediator. Davutoglu claimed that a 
nation’s value in world politics is founded on its geo-strategic locations and historical depth. In 
this regards, Turkey is uniquely positioned both because of its location in geopolitically strategic 
areas and its historical legacy as successor to the Ottoman Empire. The AKP promotes an 
independent foreign policy that puts Turkey’s relations with the West on a more equal footing 
while simultaneously prioritizing the emergence of a Turkey-friendly regional environment in 
the image of western norms.
124
 In January 2013, then Prime Minister Erdogan, declared in a 
televised interview that he would consider Turkey’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) as an alternative to the European Union.
125
 
Turkey assumed a foreign policy to complement the United States’ aspiration in the 
region by embracing the role of mediator/peacemaker.
126
 This engagement consolidated 
Turkey’s motivation in deeper ties with its neighbor. For the AKP, the fall of authoritarian 
regimes during the Arab spring one after another proved to be a crucial opening to turn the crisis 
in the region. The AKP government played the cards of anti-imperialism with Islamic, historical 
and emotional ties, soft power, with these countries in order to distinguish Turkey from other 
powers. Turkey’s emerging involvement in the Middle East, as a regional power, is linked to the 
EU’s refusal of Turkey’s full membership in the EU. During the Arab spring, President Erdogan 
referred to the sovereign rights of people, the legacy of Western imperialism in the Middle East 
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region, Islamic history and values in his speeches and visits.
127
 Iran’s effort to develop its nuclear 
weapon is a main concern for the international community. Turkey has felt the consequences of 
the instability raised in the region and geography. Therefore, Turkey was actively involved in a 
facilitation process between Iran and the West (P5+1). Although a comprehensive deal was 
finally reached in July 2015, Turkey’s national interest, aspiration for soft power, and seeking 
international prestige as well as humanitarian and moral approaches motivated Turkey along 
with Brazil to facilitate an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program beginning 2008-2009.  
The AKP government also initiated a reconciliation process between Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina based on its shared history and cultural practices. Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of 
the most important strongholds of the Ottoman Empire against the Austria-Hungarian Empire for 
more than 400 years. Cities such as Sarajevo and Mostar emerged as regional urban centers of 
culture under the Ottoman Empire. Ankara initiated an engagement with the Balkan states in 
1996, under the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). Davutoglu offered this 
mediation to help overcome the differences between Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia under the 
auspices of SEECP. These efforts produced the Istanbul Declaration of April 2010 between 
Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia.
128
 According to Ahmet Davutoglu, the challenge for Turkey in the 
twenty-first century is to redefine its place in Afro-Eurasia. Turkey considers itself at the center 
of several intersecting geopolitical regions as opposed to an appendix of Europe and an outpost 
of the West.
129
 The Balkans are a strategic link between Turkey and Western Europe. Turkey’s 
relations with Albania are based on the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1992, 
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which was bolstered by Turgu Ozal’s (in 1993) offer of large-scale aid for economic 
development and infrastructure improvement.
130
 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Turkish government 
reestablished its strategic relations with newly independent Turkic states in Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia to turn the region into a sphere of special Turkish influence. Turkey officially 
recognized Turkic-language speaking republics and signed a bundle of agreements to formalize 
its cooperation in various economic and cultural areas. “Turkey’s relations with the independent 
states of Central Asia and Transcaucasia are mainly driven by energy and kinship.”131 These are 
mainly, oil and gas, Trans- Caspian Gas pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in the 
Caspian Sea region from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. “From the very beginning 
of their political independence, Turkey made great efforts to help the Central Asian states to 
become economically independent by developing their national economies and the structural 
basis of functioning market economies.”132 The Turkish government favored political rhetoric to 
create a community of Turkic nations to embrace the more realistic aim of developing their 
Turkic identity. Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation 
Foundation (TUDEV) was strongly influenced by Alparslan Turkes
133
 and other high level 
Turkish politicians. Moreover, Turkey and Azerbaijan has always been considered as a brother 
country, which has the motto of one nation, two states. Within this context, Turkish foreign 
policy involvement with the Middle East and Turkic states is based on the Ottoman Empire 
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heritage and national identity.  (Map 1: Trans-Caspian Pipeline) and (Map 2: Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline.) 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are landlocked nations. They do not have complete 
control over the utilization of their natural resources, as they are forced to ship 
their oil and gas via pipelines that run through other countries in order to reach the 
global market. Whoever controls the pipelines, controls the energy they contain, 
which is vital to a country's economy and even military strength, as modern 
militaries, with aircraft, armored vehicles, and gas-powered ships are reliant on 
oil. 
134
 
An effective energy outlet from the area to the West via Turkey is strategically 
important for strengthening Turkey’s territorial integrity and prosperity. Turkish 
business and industry are undertaking many efforts to consolidate and expand 
their position in Central Asia. The Turkish government lends as much support as 
it can to these efforts by providing financial and technical assistance to the central 
Asian states.
135
 
Map 3.The Trans-Caspian Pipeline 
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Map 4. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
 
 
Conclusion 
Some experts believe that Turkey’s international relations are influenced by fears of 
foreign, mainly European, forces that are trying to dismantle the country.
136
 The Cold War’s end 
dramatically affected Turkey’s foreign policy. In addition to the disappearance of the Soviet 
threat, Turkey’s liberalization and integration into the world meant that the long-standing foreign 
policy discourse as based on ‘threats’ to the country became meaningless.137 In this regard, 
Turkish foreign policy is undergoing changes. Therefore, the country is seeking a new balance 
between continuing a relationship with Europe and with a new cooperative engagement in the 
Middle East and a multidimensional framework. Turkish foreign policy shifted from a focus on 
sustaining Turkey’s survival to becoming a regional power and establishing allies in the Balkans 
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and the Middle East, with the larger aim of resisting territorial ambitions of revisionist powers. 
Turkey’s assertive involvement in the Middle East, Trans-Caucasus (Turkic states) and the 
Balkans is to protect its national interests more vigorously than before. Its Ottoman history has 
undoubtedly played an important role in the increased importance given by the AKP to 
strengthening Turkey’s ties with the Muslim countries of the Middle East in order to reassert 
itself as a major player in the region. “The official narrative in regard to Ottoman soft power is 
overwhelmingly associated with Ottoman tolerance. Contemporary Turkish foreign policy 
rhetoric and public diplomacy focuses on the Ottoman heritage and tolerance.”138 
Islam is a religion both providing meaning to human existence and forming the basis of 
individual and communal identities. Islam is the common bond that unites the representatives of 
different geopolitical centers. Therefore, Islam has always influenced the social identity of 
Turkish people and paved the way to the emergence of political, cultural and economic reforms. 
In this context, since 2002, the AKP formed a single party majority government and carried out 
an extensive transformation in Turkish politics. It is not possible to analyze Turkish foreign 
policy’s involvement in the Middle East without reference to Islam and its Ottoman history. 
Turkish leadership endeavored to deepen Turkey’s economic and political connections with the 
Muslim and Turkic states in its neighborhood to enhance the regional cooperation. “Turkey’s 
political establishment is increasingly on the lookout for foreign relations beyond the country’s 
traditional exclusive orientation toward the West.”139 Within this context, in Davutoglu’s 
understanding, there is little difference between Istanbul, Sarajevo, Grozny, or Baghdad for they 
belong to the same geopolitical and civilization map, the Islamic world in general and the 
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Ottoman cultural zone in particular. Thus, Turkey should abandon the traditional status-quo 
oriented approaches and pursue a more proactive and dynamic foreign policy agenda.
140
  
National identity represents necessary myths, the source of national pride, and the values which 
underpin foreign policy. More importantly, it legitimizes the actions of government in defense of 
national interest.
141
 Turkey is not severing ties with the European states but redefining its 
relations while reaching out for a larger Eurasian role. Turgut Ozal initiated Turkey’s preference 
to engage with the Islamic and Turkic world. He embraced the idea of close relations with the 
newly independent Turkic states once the Soviet demise was clearly imminent. In the 1990s, 
Necmettin Erbakan expressed the D-8 policy, which aimed to establish close relations between 
Turkey and seven other large economically strong Muslim states: Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria. Since 2002, after the AKP came to power, Turkish 
foreign policy involvement with the Middle East and Turkic states is slowly but constantly 
increasing. Turkey has a strategic location among Asia, the Middle East and Europe. This 
geographic location provides engagement opportunities and aspiration for Turkey with 
neighboring Europe, the Middle East, Turkic states and its former Ottoman space. “Turkey’s 
national borders are only relevant on paper. Turkey has cultural, linguistic, economic and ethnic 
spillovers in all directions. Now it is time to reap the rewards of this versatility. However, all of 
these opportunities had to be realized and utilized by the understanding that they were always 
there but never activated.”142 
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As I am writing this essay, (November 2016) another emerging opportunity is for Turkey 
to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
143
 Turkey is currently a ‘dialogue partner’ 
in the SCO. President Erdogan said on November 21, 2016, “Turkey should not be ‘fixated’ on 
the idea of joining the European Union and should look at other opportunities, such as the 
Russian-led Shanghai Pact.”144 President Erdogan joined the SCO’s 16th meeting of the Heads of 
States Council, which was held in the Uzbekistan’s capital in Tashkent, June 2016. During the 
meeting it was emphasized that the enlargement process of the SCO would continue at a steady 
pace and Turkey's full membership in the organization was supported by various participants. 
President Erdogan said during his visit to China in July 2016 that Turkey wants to move its 
position in the organization from a partner to a full member.
145
 President Erdogan also said that 
“the EU has been delaying us [Turkey] for 53 years. How can such a thing happen? Moreover, 
Turkey being a part of the Shanghai 5 will allow it to act more freely [in its EU bid].”146 
Meanwhile, the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, voted on Thursday (November 24, 
2016) to suspend talks with Turkey on European Union membership. However, the vote is not 
binding, since the decision ultimately rests with the governments of the European Union’s 
member countries.
147
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CHAPTER VI 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This thesis argues that Turkey’s foreign policy includes not only the development of a 
relationship with the European Union, but also with the Middle East and the Turkic states in the 
region. I also analyze Turkey’s foreign policy activism for change and continuity under the AKP 
government. Turkey is a pivotal country, strategically located at the center of the Afro-Eurasian 
region. Turkey has a strong interest in maintaining the status quo along with extending its 
influence in Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Caspian and 
the Mediterranean. The change and continuity of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP, since 
2002, is to extend its geo-strategic ambitions to multiple regions under a multidimensional 
approach by using its geographical position. The AKP is not shifting Turkish Foreign policy 
from the West to the East. Turkey is simply expanding its foreign policy.
148
 These changes bear 
the mark of a multidimensional array of international, regional and domestic dynamics. Turkey’s 
involvement is not only in the Middle East but also includes Afro-Euroasia based on Turkey’s 
historic role stemming from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, Turkey has 
multiple identities in the region and each of these identities link Turkey with different regions.  
For example: 
1. Turkey’s historic Ottomanism and Islamic identity create bonds in the Middle East and 
the Muslim world.  
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2. ‘Turkisim’ or ‘Turkishness’ epmhasizes the importance of accepting Turkish culture as a 
political and territorial concept among Turkic Republics in Central Asia and Causcasus 
based on an ancient cultural tradition for Turkic unity. 
3. Turkey has undergone sweeping reforms due to Turkey’s accession process for full 
membership in the European Union, especially since the AKP came to power in 2001. 
National identity emerges within a historical context. The origins of Turkish identity 
trace back to the Ottoman Empire where geography played an important role in shaping national 
identities’ in the empire. The Ottoman identity was rooted in the East, in the Turkic tribes’ 
Central Asia and as well as the traditions of Islam. Ottoman intellectuals developed the idea of 
Ottomanism –unity of elements- or the idea of Ottoman patriotisim, Islamism - the idea of unity 
of all Muslims (ittihad-i Islam)- and Turkish nationalism to find a common ground for its diverse 
population.
149
 In this context, Turkey’s geographical and historical richness as a source of soft 
power are reflected in the region. Turkey as a regional power was accomplished through the 
desire to maintain its status gained in the long legacy of the Ottoman Empire.Turkey is a status 
quo power which promotes and ensures the international system through amending and 
balancing its foreign policy. Therefore, Turkey should seek the role of a major power utilizing its 
own sources of power, history, and geography. In this regard, in order to understand the aims of 
global ambition and power, Turkey should be more proactive and reactive in its geo-strategic and 
geo-political positioning in order to demand its re-assessed place in the world.  
 Gaining regional and then global power is a costly business. Turkey is able to maintain 
and increase its steady pursuit of allies to form a greater power-bloc in the region for the 
country’s geo-strategic expansionism including full membership with the European Union, 
                                                          
149
 Kosebalaban,25 
60 
 
despite obstacles and decades of the prolonged accession process in the EU. The ambivalent 
accession process over Turkey’s EU candidacy shows that the EU still has a very long way to go 
if it aspires to be a Kantian federation of Europe. No matter how modern and secular the 
European self-understanding; its modernity and secularism is heavily indebted to an 
Enlightenment rooted in Christianity.
150
 Turkey’s bid for EU membership is essential for the 
region in order to link Afro-Asia to Europe.  Only Turkey can play this important role because of 
its geopolitical and geostrategic location connecting both continents.  Turkey as a Eurasian 
country has influence over its surrounding regions. Turkey calls itself a status quo power. 
According to political scientist Randall Schweller’s description “Status-quo states are content to 
preserve the essential characteristics of the existing international order and the general 
distribution of power.”151  Therefore, Turkey, as a status quo state occupies a space that could 
embrace shared norms in order to ensure the survival of the global system. By reaching across 
three continents, the AKP government’s foreign policy has been a response to changes in the 
international system, characterized by globalization and an increasingly multipolar international 
system.
152
 In sum, Turkey is increasingly pursuing an active foreign policy approach with the 
continuation of the EU membership process under a multidimensional foreign policy to deal with 
regional and global issues in a more effective method. AKP government has a liberal-oriented 
geopolitical practice in shaping Turkey’s regional policy and it has an Islamist geopolitical 
vision in terms of connecting history and culture to foreign policy. 
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List of Abbreviations 
AKP  Justice and Development Party 
ANAP  Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) 
DAESH Islamic State of Iraq and Levant  
D-8  Organization for Economic Cooperation (also known as Developing-8) 
EC  European Community 
EEC  European Economic Community 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
ENP  European Neighborhood Policy 
EU  European Union 
FP  Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) 
G-20  The Group of Twenty  
ISIS or ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and Levant  
MSP  National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) 
MNP  National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) 
P5+1  UN Security Council's five permanent members (the P5); namely China, France,  
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus (+1) is Germany. 
PKK  Kurdistan Worker’s Party  
RP  Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) 
SCO  Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SDGs   Development Goals 
SEECP South East European Cooperation Process 
TFP  Turkish foreign policy 
TUDEV Turkic States and Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation 
Foundation  
UN  United Nations 
UEFA   the Union of European Football Associations 
USA  the United States of America 
